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Chapter 1
The Future of Public Employee
Retirement Systems
Olivia S. Mitchell

Pension systems are a central component of the compensation package
for workers in virtually every developed nation, and nowhere is this more
important than for public sector employees. In the United States, for
instance, state and local pension systems cover over 27 million active and
retired workers (GAO 2008) and federal pensions cover 10 million active
and retired workers. In other countries, as we detail in the following text,
public sector pensions are also taking center stage, wielding impressive
financial and political clout, while at the same time portending huge costs.
The growth of these public pension systems has spurred hot debate of
late, for several reasons. First, some private-sector employees envy their
public sector counterparts due to the relatively generous benefits negotiated by strong unions that traditionally represent civil servants. Second,
some politicians argue that pension and healthcare benefits paid to police
and firefighters, schoolteachers, and other civil servants, have become too
expensive for the public purse. In the private sector benefits costs have been
cut by replacing defined benefit (DB) pensions by defined contribution
(DC) plans; this has not yet occurred to any large extent in the public
arena. And finally, the costs of maintaining public sector pension plans have
come under the microscope of late, as municipalities, states, and other governmental units facing difficult financial times and volatile capital markets
realize they must cut corners. These stresses are challenging many aspects
of the public employee labor contract and raise questions about how such
employees are attracted to the public sector, retained and motivated on the
job, and retired, via the entire compensation package of wages and benefits.
This volume takes up these and other themes pertinent to the future
of public employee retirement systems. In the first section, we build on
our prior work (Mitchell and Hustead 2000) to focus on financial aspects
of these schemes, addressing the cost and valuation debate in the public
arena. Next, we offer an examination of public retirement system reform,
exploring actual and proposed efforts to bring public pensions into better
financial status in countries from the United States to Japan, and Canada to
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Germany. Several chapters provide case studies illustrating specific aspects
of risk management and the process of reform. Last, we take up the political
economy of how these asset pools are perceived and managed, an increasingly important topic in times of global financial turmoil.
This volume will be of substantial importance to a wide range of readers.
Public sector employees and their representatives will find the comparisons
and arguments over pension asset and liability valuation of keen interest.
Public administrators and policymakers seeking an explanation of what
makes these plans so costly will gain a new understanding of how the
arguments stack up. In addition, private sector employers and plan sponsors can learn much from efforts to reform these retirement systems in
states and countries around the world. Finally, investors and the taxpaying
public more generally may be at risk to cover these long-term promises, so
it behooves them to pay close attention to the financing and investment
practices of these plans, along with their valuation. In what follows we offer
an overview and summary of key findings.

Costs and benefits of public retirement systems
Policymakers and scholars have recently become embroiled in a debate
over what valuation and accounting methodology should be used for pension plan assets and liabilities. In the case of corporate pensions, there is
relatively widespread agreement regarding how to do this valuation. In
the United States, for instance, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) requires mark-to-market reporting of corporate pension assets and
liabilities, and the UK Financial Reporting Council and the European International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have similar views. Though
the implementation of the approach regarding timing and details may differ slightly across countries, the general movement over the last decade has
been to adopt a market-based approach to valuing private sector pension
assets and liabilities.1
In the case of public employee pensions, however, there is far more
controversy about whether an actuarial or market-based approach should
be preferred and by whom (the latter is often termed the Market Valuation for Liabilities or MVL for short). As an example, Andrew Wozniak
and Peter Austin (2008: 3) argue that ‘[g]iven the long-term nature and
security of public pensions, plan management is generally focused on
long-term cost, not short-term market related solvency. Many practitioners
take the view that long-term cost is minimized if investment earnings are
maximized thus reducing contributions while covering future benefit payments and plan expense.’ A similar view is offered by a former member
of the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), Girard Miller
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1 / The Future of Public Employee Retirement Systems 3

who states (2008: 2): ‘By retaining the traditional practice of using reasonably probable investment returns as the basis for discounting future
obligations . . . actuaries and accountants faithfully support the primary purpose of a public pension plan—which is to establish a funding plan that
has the best possible chance of equitably balancing the interests of today’s
taxpayers and tomorrow’s retirees. Many . . . would agree with me that using
risk-free rates of return to value public plans (which enjoy a long-term
horizon and capacity to prudently assume equity risks) will almost assuredly
overburden today’s taxpayers.
Such an MVL regime would perversely shift the entire normal market
risk premium to the benefit of future generations at the expense of their
forebears.’ But other experts disagree, including David Wilcox (2008: 1)
who notes:
Some have argued that because state and local governments do not exist to generate
a profit, or because public plan sponsors cannot go out of business or be acquired by
a competitor, market-based estimates are irrelevant for them. Others have argued
that policymakers need other information aside from market-based estimates in
order to make sound decisions on behalf of their constituents . . . in order to be
useful, an estimate of plan liabilities must provide an analytically sound answer to
a coherent, well-specified question. Market-based estimates of plan liabilities meet
that test.

The first section of this volume provides several perspectives and insights
into this vexed question. In his chapter, Stephen McElhaney notes that US
public sector entities are permitted wide choice over cost methods and
assumptions. This, in effect, allows them not to mark to market either their
pension promises or their retiree health benefit obligations. One result is
that it is not possible to compare public pension scheme liabilities, assets,
and therefore funding rates across the broad array of states, cities, and
municipalities with each other, nor with their private sector counterparts.
For instance, on average, public pension plans use an 8 percent discount
rate, while private sector firms must use lower long-term bond rates to
determine the market value of liabilities. Given current practice, the author
calculates that promised state and local government pension and healthcare liabilities total about $2.4 trillion, versus dedicated pension assets of
less than $2 trillion. Underfunding would be far greater in public sector
plans if discount rates comparable to those used in the private pension
arena were adopted.2
These and other differences between public and private pension
accounting practice are permitted by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board on the argument that private businesses can go bankrupt,
whereas governments financed via the involuntary payment of taxes are
much less likely to default. Nevertheless, the governmental accounting
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group has announced its intention to review its public pension financing
rules in the next several years, to determine whether changes in practice
are required. McElhaney does not believe that GASB will, however, move
to a fully mark-to-market framework. Instead he suggests that public plans
should at a minimum be asked to certify that the assumptions they use
in valuating theses plans reflect their actuary’s best judgment. Currently,
the plan actuary must certify that his assumptions are reasonable and in
compliance with accepted standards, but he need not confirm that the
results are congruent with his best estimate.
Another contrarian view to traditional public sector pension valuation
practice is offered by Jeremy Gold and Gordon Latter. In their chapter,
these authors contend that actuaries are skilled at developing long-term
projections and budgets, but they worry that the projections tend not
to be tightly linked to economic realities and market conditions. Their
gravest concern arises when pension asset and liability figures differ which
produces a misallocation of resources. To illustrate their case, the authors
select four defined benefit plans from different regions of the United States
and report both actuarial and market value measures of plan liabilities and
funding ratios. The chapter shows that the four plans have funding ratios
ranging from 66 to 106 percent using the conventional actuarial accrued
liability approach. By contrast, using the authors’ preferred measure of
market value of liabilities, the plans are only 50–80 percent funded. What
this means is that the costs of offering a pension promise when interest rates
are 4 percent is massively more expensive than when rates are 12 percent.
A defense of the traditional public employee DB plan is central to
M. Barton Waring’s chapter where he alludes to the mythical Greek sea
monsters Scylla and Charybdis, who inspired the expression ‘between a
rock and a hard place.’ He argues that DB plans are important to retain
despite the perception that they may be risky and expensive, since in his
view, the DC model does not work particularly well either. The author finds
that the average balance in a DC plan today is only about $150,000, so
that DC participants cannot expect to live well in retirement with such a
small accrual. While DC plans could, in theory, provide as much income
security as DB plans, they would need to have much higher mandatory
contributions than usually found and annuitization features that are not
often automatic. In terms of the mark-to-market debate, he contends that
the MVL approach must prevail inasmuch as public and private plans
borrow in the same capital markets and face the same interest rates.
In his view, a ‘tough love’ plan of action is needed to control risk in
underfunded plans and change reporting, contribution, and benefit policy.
Most crucially, in his view, public plans would do well to simply agree to
adopt a regular reduction in the discount rate used until they reach the
long-term government bond rate. When it comes to benefits, he suggests
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that labor and management must review existing levels using current market data to fend off possible legislation that might be tougher on the overall
package. Waring further argues that the real reason public pension systems
adopt a traditional actuarial viewpoint is not that they do not understand
the economic discount rate. Rather, he suspects that plan sponsors are
‘worried about what the legislature is going to do if they walk in and say
the pension liability is 40 percent more than what they said it was.’ Since
the majority of state pensions make explicit in the state constitutions a
commitment to pay public sector employee benefits (GAO 2008), marking
the liabilities to market would impose a rude shock to managers seeking to
smooth contribution flows.
Pension funding volatility is the subject of Parry Young’s chapter, which
notes that state and local governments have experienced substantially
higher volatility in pension funding ratios, and hence contributions, of
late than ever before. In many jurisdictions, he finds that this volatility has
been a substantial burden for the planning and budgeting process. Young
points out that annual required contributions to public plans can vary due
to many factors such as benefit and demographic changes, larger than
anticipated investment gains or losses, and changes in the actuarial assumptions. He cites data showing that state and local government employers’
plan contributions rose from 10.5 percent of payroll in fiscal 1997, to 6.8
percent in 2002, to 14.7 percent in 2003, and 29.5 percent in 2004. Yet,
state revenue patterns are such that money has not always been available
to boost government contributions over the last decade. Young also notes
that recent declines in capital market values have created serious funding
shortfalls for many public pension funds. He argues that rate volatility is the
natural result of holding riskier assets, implying that by addressing market
values and volatility with wise choice of assets, plan sponsors can immunize
themselves substantially against such shocks.
In a chapter devoted to a comparison of the relative costs of hiring
public versus private sector employees, Ken McDonnell shows that the
average state and local worker costs employers substantially more in wages
and benefits than in the private sector. For instance, total compensation
costs were 51 percent higher for state and local employers compared to
private firms, which results from 43 percent higher wages and salaries,
and 73 percent higher employee benefits including pensions. The author
outlines possible explanations for these differences and concludes that they
are in part due to higher unionization rates raising wages and benefits in
the public sector. In addition, there are differences with regard to both
occupation and industry mix: for example, public sector workers in the
‘service sector’ category include skilled and risky jobs such as police and
firefighter, whereas private sector service workers tend to be less skilled
waiters/waitresses, and work in cleaning and building services functions
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with traditionally lower wages. The compensation differences are even
larger for health insurance benefits, where state and local government
employer costs are 235 percent higher per hour than for private employees,
and 330 percent higher for state and local government employers.
Turning to administrative costs of public sector plans, Edwin Hustead
reviews a set of DB and DC plans offered in different states in America
to explore the range and diversity of pure, hybrid, and individual account
schemes. He notes that in the public sector, most US pensions were originally established as DB programs. Hence the systems that today have DC
elements have usually added these features alongside a traditional DB plan.
In his analysis, he finds that DB annual plan expenses are rather low,
totaling only about 0.1 percent of assets. One reason they are so low is
that these plans are large and have been in place for decades. By contrast,
the public DC plans are typically much newer and hence smaller. Here he
finds that annual administrative costs amount to about 0.2 to 0.3 percent
of assets. Hustead’s research also captures costs in the federal government
retirement systems, which differ from the states in having a separate administrative organizational structure for DC and DB plans. Here administrative
costs are small and similar across plan types. For the Federal DB case, he
reports annual costs of 0.3 percent of contributions or 0.02 percent of
assets, while DC expenses are 0.4 percent of contributions or 0.04 percent of assets. His overview suggests that large public sector retirement
systems which are either exclusively defined benefit or exclusively defined
contribution would have similar administrative costs, holding constant
plan size.
In the final chapter in this section, Toni Hustead takes up the question
of how policymakers, participants, and taxpayers might think more clearly
about how to report and finance Federal employee pensions. In the United
States, there are more than 30 Federal pension plans that cover over 10
million active and retired participants; the two largest of these are for
Federal civilian employees, namely the Federal Civil Service Retirement
System (CSRS) which covers civilian employees who entered service before
1984, and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) which covers
all new hires after 1983 (plus employees who elected to transfer from CSRS
to FERS). A third large plan covers military participants and their families,
the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Retirement System. The author
notes that recent changes in federal government pension accounting now
require each employing US Federal agency to budget for the accruing liability of retirement for its current personnel. And the US Congress has set
up Federal trust funds which are supposed to receive annual payments sufficient to cover benefits earned that year and amortization amounts to pay off
past unfunded liabilities. Nevertheless, as these trust funds are invested in
Federal securities, the Treasury is permitted to spend the receipts similar to
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Social Security Trust Fund bonds. Ultimately then, these Federal schemes
can be described as at least partially funded, though in fact they still depend
on policymakers’ willingness to raise money to pay the bills when retirees
need to be paid.

Implementing public retirement system reform
Public pension reforms are also underway in other developed nations. Raimond Maurer, Olivia Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla review civil servant pension systems in Germany, where most state schemes are tax-sponsored, noncontributory unfunded DB plans. State governments finance the programs
by raising taxes and sometimes by investing in government bonds that they
typically issue themselves. Their chapter goes on to explore an alternative
approach using a model that lays out some of the risks and rewards of
moving from a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system to a partially funded pension
plan. The analysis begins with an actuarial valuation of pension promises
due to current and retired workers. Next the authors project 50 years
out, to estimate the payroll-related contribution rate necessary to fund the
pension obligation. Then, using a Monte Carlo framework and a stochastic
present value approach, combined with a conditional value at risk measure,
the authors can determine what asset allocation minimizes the worst-case
pension costs. The authors report that pre-funding the plan at 20 percent
of payroll and investing 30 percent of the assets in equities and 70 percent
in bonds sharply curtails the worst-case pension costs. Finally, they outline
contribution rates and asset allocation when a plan sponsor is required to
stick to a set level of risk. They point out that debate on whether to pre-fund
public pension obligations will require being explicit about the level of risk
that the plan fiduciary is willing to take on. This, in turn, requires a hard
look at risk bearing for future and present generations.
In her study on Canadian public plans, Silvana Pozzebon notes that
Canadian public employees are relatively free of pension envy. That is, there
has been no backlash against public sector employees due to their generous
pensions; instead, these plans continue to be seen as a way to attract workers
to the fields of education and health care. These plans do, however, face
challenges, as provincial governments seek to protect budgets against sharp
increases in unfunded pension liabilities and demographic pressure due to
workforce aging. The Canadian public sector exploded between the 1960s
and 1970s, and now a large group of workers is nearing retirement age. As
one example, the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan began investing in equities in 1990 and has been seen as one of the best-performing retirement
programs in Canada. Yet it now faces deficits and they cannot expect the
government to pick up the tab.
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How Japan copes with the demographic shift is the subject of much
interest due to that nation’s status as the most rapidly aging country on
earth. Junichi Sakamoto describes the foundation and development of
Japan’s civil service pension systems, which from 1985 have been gradually
merged with systems covering private sector workers. The author traces
the development of Japan’s pension system back to the new government
after Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century, which initiated Japan’s
transformation to an industrial economy. The government established
a superannuation system for civil servants and members of the armed
forces on the theory that they had given their lives to the nation. In the
early twentieth century, other public employees began to form mutual aid
associations around their workplaces. After World War II, the two types
of public pension plans merged, and local government workers gained
coverage in 1962. Meanwhile, private sector employees had no pension
coverage until 1942 when Japan created the Employees’ Pension Insurance
(EPI) scheme, modeled after the German pension insurance system. As
the nation went through industrial change in the 1960s, the system was
stressed. As employees were made redundant by changing technology in
some schemes, fewer workers remained to support older beneficiaries. The
mutual aid association for Japan Railway employees nearly collapsed and
eventually was absorbed by the EPI scheme. Responding to growing imbalances, the government called for consolidation of private and government
sector plans in 1985; only in 2007 was a bill introduced calling for all four
remaining schemes to merge. One continued sticking point is whether to
require the self-employed and farmers to join the scheme.
Just as public pension schemes around the world have experienced
change, so too have US public pension plans continued to evolve. Keith
Brainard’s chapter contends that the prevailing retirement plan model in
public sector jobs is still a DB pension, but his further examination shows
that many public systems also offer a DC plan alongside the DB plan. His
work provides examples from states introducing hybrid plans and other
innovations, including Nebraska which in 2003 introduced a cash balance
plan for state and county workers. Existing DC participants received a onetime opportunity to switch, and 30 percent chose to take advantage of the
offer. In 2007, the plan offered a second chance to participate and an additional 4 percent opted in. The Minnesota Teachers’ Retirement Association
offers so-called ‘Earnings Limitation Savings Accounts’ that comply with
Internal Revenue Service rules and encourage teachers to return to work
after retiring. These plans are designed to provide added income security
for the teachers and improve the pool of educators for the state. Brainard
notes that permitting employees to return to work is sometimes criticized
as encouraging ‘double dipping,’ but the Minnesota plan overcomes this
argument by depositing pension benefits into an individual account that
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becomes accessible as a lump sum at age 65. The Arizona State Retirement
System has an investment earnings-based Cost of Living Allowance (COLA)
paid for through earnings that are greater than actuarial assumptions.
About two-thirds of state and local plans have automatic COLAs and others rely on ad hoc COLAs granted by legislation, but the author argues
that dropping a new COLA into a defined benefit plan where it has not
been pre-funded over the years proves quite expensive. Another innovative
approach is seen in Oregon, where the legislature established a new hybrid
plan that mandates individual contributions. The DC contributions are
professionally managed by the DB fund managers, giving participants the
chance to hold a portfolio that they otherwise would not have access to, and
it avoids having participants navigate the investment market on their own.
A discussion of best practices in the public DC pension arena is taken
up in the chapter by Roderick Crane, Michael Heller, and Paul Yakoboski. The authors review key features of state plans for general employees
as well as several public higher education plans, and they highlight several practices they deem innovative. These include defaulting participants
into target date life cycle funds and providing a limited (15–20) set of
participant-directed investment choices. They argue that this menu, linked
with investment advice and investment education, is likely to enhance
retiree well-being. They also contend that it is useful to ensure that pension
contributions total at least 12 percent of pay if the workers are covered
by Social Security, or 18–20 percent of pay if not. In terms of the payout
process, they laud the fact that all but three of the state plans and all of
the higher education plans offer an annuity option at retirement, and most
offered some exposure to equities after retirement.3

The political economy of public pension reform
An understanding of the political economy of public pension reform is
facilitated with an historic overview of how these systems have evolved
over time. The chapter by Robert Clark, Lee Craig, and Neveen Ahmed
describes how US public pensions date back to the Colonial Era, when
Britain’s North American colonies established disability pensions for members of the militia. The chapter traces how municipalities began to offer
pensions to teachers, firefighters, and police officers during the midnineteenth century, and these plans grew with civil service reforms that
curbed patronage. States then offered pensions to employees beginning
in the early twentieth century and were spurred by the 1935 Social Security Act, which specifically excluded public employees. In the 1950s, the
Social Security Act was amended to include public sector employees, allowing government units to enter or withdraw from the system voluntarily.
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By 1961, all but five states had public pension plans; as of 1991, Social
Security became mandatory for public employees with no pension plan.
Turning to an analysis of today’s public employee pensions, the authors
report that public sector employee DB pensions offer benefit replacement
rates of around 56 percent of the worker’s income at the time of retirement.
The majority of public sector workers are also covered by Social Security.
Meanwhile, and by sharp contrast, private sector DB plans have been on
the wane, and many corporate employers have now terminated or frozen
them, with a switch to DC plans. Clark and colleagues examine trends in
replacement rates over time, where they find that state plans tend to be
more generous relative to private-sector plans. The key question is whether
states can continue to afford the relatively generous benefits in view of rapid
population aging and fiscal stress.
A different view of the political nature of public pensions is offered
by Brad Barber (2009), who explains that management adds one level of
costs for shareholders seeking the maximum value for their investment in
a corporation. Good governance typically limits those costs as shareholders
in scandal-ridden companies, such as Tyco and Enron, learned firsthand
in recent years. For pension funds, an extra layer of costs is associated
with the portfolio manager that accumulates investments and then acts as a
shareholder for the beneficiaries. Another cost can occur if fund managers
have a political, moral, or personal agenda that does not align directly
with shareholder value. In public funds, he adds, the portfolio manager
is actually a triumvirate of the investment manager, the pension board,
and the legislative body overseeing public-sector retirement plans. When
it comes to activism, fund managers can have varying effects. Some may be
self-serving autocrats forcing their own political agendas, while others can
be a benevolent enforcer reducing agency costs, which benefits not only for
investors but the market as a whole.
Barber offers as an example the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) with its history of activism since 1984, when the
system gained authority to invest 25 percent of its assets in equities. Three
years later, CalPERS launched its governance program aimed at improving corporate performance by using its weight as a shareholder to block
corporate poison pills. In 1992, it became more aggressive, publishing an
annual focus list of companies it would attempt to influence. In addition
to public crusades, CalPERS does extensive behind-the-scenes negations at
companies to influence governance. Barber has tracked the performance
of the CalPERS focus list over the past 15 years and finds a slight advantage, but not enough to be scientifically determinative. Nonetheless, he
says, interventions in corporate governance such as fighting a poison pill
or eliminating classes of stock have sound theoretical underpinnings to
suggest they do create shareholder value. Beyond corporate governance
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issues, pension fund managers have become involved in other forms of
activism. Barber notes that CalPERS has been ordered by legislation to
use its influence to demand corporations divest from businesses in South
Africa, Sudan, and Iran. In addition to legislative demands, the CalPERS
board has also taken stands against corporations on social grounds. In
2000, overriding the recommendation of its staff, the board ordered the
fund to divest from tobacco companies, stating that tobacco stocks were
risky because of litigation. The CalPERS board has become involved in
labor strife with a grocery chain, which in his view, imposed reputational
consequences on the pension fund.
Barber does believe that activism originating from a fund’s investment
committee aimed at governance, which he calls shareholder activism, can be
rational. And when funds take on broader social causes, what he terms
social activism, beneficiaries and taxpayers may pay a price. Divestment
policies, he notes, automatically put funds at a disadvantage in terms of
investment performance. In his view, there is no question that constraints
on investment opportunity hurt the fund; rather the only question is how
much and whether it is material. He believes that public pension funds can
endanger their returns with such action, meaning that they may lose their
original objective of protecting retirees.
An alternative different perspective is offered by Beth Almeida, Kelly
Kenneally, and David Madland (2009) who note that public plan retirement assets per participant are twice those in the private sector. They
also indicate that existing public employee pension obligations could be
met with an increase in contributions of less than 1 percent of payroll.
At the same time, they acknowledge that opposition to traditional DB
pensions is moving into the public arena. Public sector plans are influenced by public opinion because voters and taxpayers have a say in the
design of the plans, either through ballot issues or the representatives they
elect. Almeida adds, however, that most voters know very little about the
issue. For instance, many workers cannot say whether their own retirement scheme is a DB or a DC plan. The authors analyze survey data
and find that among the voting public, public sector employees, women,
and those who have DB plans themselves tend to be most supportive of
public sector pensions, while those with an individualistic ideology are
less supportive. Republican-party affiliation has no effect, after controlling
for other factors including ideological perspective. Other research indicates that states with Republican-controlled legislatures have been more
aggressive than other states in attempting to change public plans from
defined benefit to defined contribution. The authors find the results
interesting because it would appear that individual voters are not clamoring for change, so they attribute the debate at least in part to partisan
politics.
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The authors then provide four case studies, for Alaska, Colorado, California, and Utah, where there have been recent debates about switching
from DB to DC plans. In those states, they argue that anti-tax, libertarian
groups have taken an ideological stand against public defined benefit plans.
Yet these efforts had only mixed success in drawing the public and elected
representatives to their cause. The authors conclude that the challenges to
public defined benefit plans do not appear to stem from well-articulated
critiques or well-established economic consideration, nor from widespread
public dissatisfaction. Rather, interest groups seek to dismantle defined
benefit plans as part of their agenda.

Conclusion
At present, most US public employee plans appear to have sufficient assets
to continue paying retirement benefits for some time. In fact, as the GAO
(2008: 19) notes, some analysts suggest that a public plan funding level of
80 percent could be a sensible target, since ‘. . . it is unlikely that public
entities will go out of business or cease operations as can happen with
private sector employers, and state and local governments can spread the
costs of unfunded liabilities over a period of up to 30 years under current
GASB standards. In addition . . . it can be politically unwise for a plan to be
overfunded; that is, to have a funded ratio over 100 percent. The contributions made to funds with “excess” assets can become a target for lawmakers
with other priorities or for those wishing to increase retiree benefits.’
Nevertheless, the doomsayers also have a point. The current economic
environment has produced a ‘perfect storm’ for public pensions, where
low interest rates are spiking liabilities, depressed equity markets are whittling away assets, and economic recession is drying up state and local tax
revenue. In fact, the GAO (2008) has noted that almost two-thirds of the
plans it reviewed contributed less than necessary to meet annual required
levels, with the shortfalls being most pronounced among the worst-funded
plans. Such behavior implies that taxpayers and public employees will have
to pay more in the future, and it may also lead to curtailed retiree benefits
(Barrett and Green 2008). Inasmuch as public employee pensions are not
guaranteed by the federal government, it is even possible that public sector
plans might default. Whereas this has not happened to date in the United
States, it is true that a few cities and towns (including Cleveland, OH, and
Bridgeport, CT, as well as Vallejo, CA) have declared bankruptcy.
Accordingly, the task ahead is to ensure that public sector retirement
systems do have a future, one that is both affordable and resilient to
economic and demographic pressures. It is incumbent not only on plan
fiduciaries and the politicians to whom they report, but also the taxpaying
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public and those in the investment arena, to ensure that these commitments are transparently valued and financed in the most cost-effective and
generationally fair manner.

Notes
1

2

3

Nevertheless, recent research (Coronado et al. 2008) on US corporate pensions
suggests that corporate pension liabilities and assets are not yet fully reflected in
company share prices.
For instance, a recent study by Novy-Marx and Rauh (2008) contends that
accrued benefits under the 50 US state retirement systems are underfunded by $2
trillion, on the assumption that the benefit promises can be valued at a risk-free
discount rate. They suggest that this is reasonable if the pension payouts cannot
be abrogated, consistent with the fact that many public pension payments are
backed by the full faith and credit of the sponsoring state governments.
An alternative model called the Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) scheme
advanced by the Dutch is also of some relevance, though not taken up in this
volume in detail. See Bovenberg (2008).
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